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Case Comment 
UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ:  DEFAMING THE 
MEDAL OF HONOR THROUGH LIES, DECEIT, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT† 
“[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of 
individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is 
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of 
society as a whole.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Within the ambit of the First Amendment lies one of America’s most 
cherished freedoms—the right to free speech.2  It is because of this right 
that government does not have the power to restrict expression simply 
because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content.3  As a result, 
there is a presumption of invalidity regarding content-based restrictions 
on speech, and the burden is on the government to prove that the statute 
is the least restrictive means to achieve the government’s interest.4  This 
freedom, however, is not limitless, and the courts have upheld some 
content-based restrictions when limited to well-known “historic and 
traditional” categories.5 
Since the courts have carved out these exceptions, numerous cases 
have raised the issue of whether “false” statements are included within 
the categories of speech that fall outside of the Constitution’s protection.6  
                                                 
†  Winner of the 2013 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition. 
1 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988) (quoting Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Specifically, the First Amendment provides:  “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
3 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citing 
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
4 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 660.  See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 476 (2009) 
(summarizing the Courts’ jurisprudence in analyzing content-based restrictions on speech). 
5 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (explaining that 
the Court does not give constitutional protection to certain categories of speech, such as 
“‘fighting’ words”); see also infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (listing several 
categories of speech that the Court has held fall outside the First Amendment’s reach). 
6 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976) (declaring that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never 
been protected for its own sake”); see also Kenneth E. Biggins, Clarifying Commercial Speech:  
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In 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Alvarez 
to determine whether the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was a content-based 
restriction on free speech and thus violated the First Amendment.7  In a 
departure from a long line of cases that recognize the right to free speech 
does not protect false factual statements, the court struck down the 
Stolen Valor Act.8 
In analyzing the Court’s decision in Alvarez, this Comment 
contemplates whether the Supreme Court should have carved out an 
exception for false statements of fact regarding the receipt of military 
honors.9  With this in mind, this Comment first discusses the facts 
present in United States v. Alvarez.10  Second, it reviews the legal 
background of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech by 
placing great emphasis on the Court’s previous rulings involving false 
statements of fact.11  Last, this Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Alvarez by first arguing that, although the Court did not frame 
its analysis under the overbreadth doctrine, the Court applied those 
principles with an incorrect result; and, second, although the court 
                                                                                                             
Restructuring and Redefining the Zauderer and Central Hudson Standards in Light of the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. xxx, xxx (2014) 
(explaining the non-misleading requirement for commercial speech).  But see N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (holding that the “erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . .  to survive’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 433 (1963))).  Additionally, most cases involving false statements of fact include a 
valuation of whether those statements have any real constitutional value.  See, e.g., Hustler 
Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52 (“False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere 
with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas . . . .”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”). 
7 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537, 2542–43 (plurality opinion) (stating that it granted 
certiorari and that content-based restrictions must be judged by First Amendment 
principles); see also 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (providing that “[w]hoever falsely represents 
himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal 
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the service 
medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of 
any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable imitation of such item shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both”).  Section 704(c)(1) 
recognizes that “[i]f a decoration or medal involved in an offense under section (a) or (b) is 
a Congressional Medal of Honor, . . . the punishment” is enhanced to a fine, 
“imprison[ment] [of] not more than 1 year, or both.”  Id. § 704(c)(1). 
8 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion) (“The Stolen Valor Act infringes upon 
speech protected by the First Amendment.”). 
9 See infra Parts II–IV (considering whether the Court should have established an 
exception for false statements concerning military honors). 
10 See infra Part II (stating the facts in United States v. Alvarez). 
11 See infra Part III (reviewing, briefly, the evolution of the Supreme Court’s position 
regarding the protection of false statements of fact over the past seventy years). 
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correctly concluded that the Stolen Valor Act was a content-based 
restriction requiring strict scrutiny review, the result was incorrect.12 
II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS IN UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 
In July 2007, after obtaining a seat on the Three Valley Water District 
Board of Directors, Xavier Alvarez (“Alvarez”) introduced himself at a 
joint meeting with a neighboring water district board.13  Upon standing, 
Alvarez asserted that he was a retired marine of twenty-five years and 
had received the Congressional Medal of Honor after surviving several 
wounds from the same person.14  Unknown to Alvarez, before his 
election to the water district board, a woman had contacted the FBI and 
informed them that Alvarez was making false claims about his military 
past.15  Specifically, the woman alleged that Alvarez had told her that he 
had “won the Medal of Honor for rescuing the American Ambassador 
during the Iranian hostage crisis, and that he had been shot in the back 
as he returned to the embassy to save the American flag.”16  Later, it was 
discovered that all of Alvarez’s claims of previous military service and 
awards were complete fabrications.17 
Ultimately, “[a]fter the FBI obtained a recording of the water district 
board meeting” as evidence, “Alvarez was indicted in the Central 
District of California on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c)(1)” 
and “was charged with ‘falsely represent[ing] verbally that he had been 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor” when he knew, in truth, 
that he had never received the medal.18  Alvarez moved to dismiss the 
indictment on constitutional grounds, asserting that the Act violated his 
right to free speech, but the district court denied the motion.19  
                                                 
12 See infra Part IV (providing a critical analysis of why the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Alvarez was incorrect). 
13 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 
(2012). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1201. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. at 1200–01 (stating that most of these statements were lies).  In general, Alvarez 
was notorious for making up stories about who he was and what he had accomplished 
throughout his lifetime.  See id. at 1201 (explaining other situations in which Alvarez had 
lied). 
18 Id.; see supra note 7 (providing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c)(1)). 
19 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201.  At the time this case was reviewed, “Alvarez appear[ed] to 
be the first person charged and convicted under the . . . [Stolen Valor] Act.”  Id. 
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Subsequently, Alvarez pleaded guilty to the first count and reserved “his 
right to appeal the First Amendment question.”20 
On appeal, Alvarez argued that the Act was unconstitutional on its 
face and as it applied to him.21  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed Alvarez’s conviction, holding that 
the Act did not fall under any other previously permitted restrictions on 
false speech and was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest.22  After a request for a rehearing en banc was 
denied, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the 
constitutionality of the Act’s reach.23 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress 
from passing laws that abridge the freedom of speech.24  However, in 
1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court limited this freedom 
when it declared that the right to free speech was not absolute.25  
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that some content-based 
restrictions on speech were permissible when limited to the few 
“‘historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar.’”26  The 
Court established these categories to include incitement, obscenity, 
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child 
pornography, fraud, true threats, and grave and imminent threats that 
the government has the power to prevent.27  Notably absent from this list 
                                                 
20 Id.  The district court sentenced Alvarez “to pay a $100 special assessment and a 
$5,000 fine, to serve three years of probation, and to perform 416 hours of community 
service.”  Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1218; see id. at 1220–41 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (stating that false statements of fact 
have traditionally not been protected under the First Amendment and providing a history 
of free speech jurisprudence). 
23 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(questioning the Act’s validity after the Tenth Circuit deemed it constitutional, while the 
Ninth Circuit held it was unconstitutional).  Seven judges in the Ninth Circuit dissented on 
the rehearing denial.  Id. 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 2 (providing the text of the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution). 
25 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)). 
26 United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting Simon & Shuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
27 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion) (outlining the “historic and 
traditional categories” that are long familiar to the bar); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 
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is any explicit exception for false statements.28  Although some of these 
unprotected categories involve the use of false speech, the courts have 
continued to disagree as to how much constitutional protection, if any, 
false statements should receive.29 
In the following cases, the Court continually held that false speech 
had little value, but nevertheless was constitutionally protected, and 
could be regulated as long as there was proof that the false statement 
was made knowingly.30  For example, in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, after 
establishing that the protection of the First Amendment does not turn on 
truth, the Court held that in a defamation suit a public official must 
demonstrate that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge 
of its falsity or “with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”31 
Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court took the N.Y. Times Co. 
standard even further by holding that the state may punish defamatory 
falsehoods about private individuals regarding matters of public 
concern, if they were less-than recklessly made and caused actual injury 
                                                                                                             
(defining the categories to include obscenity, defamation, fighting words, and incitement); 
see also Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog:  A Proposal for Blogging, 
Employment-at-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 245, 251–52 
(2007) (explaining that First Amendment freedom of speech is not absolute and listing 
several exceptions).  Also, public service employees do not have unfettered free speech 
rights.  See Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limits?  Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on 
Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 140–41 (2012) (laying out the Court’s test for 
determining whether public employees’ speech is protected). 
28 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion). 
29 See id. at 2545 (providing a list of cases that have commented on the First 
Amendment’s protection of false statements).  However, this position is inherently 
confusing because of the different standards depending on the type of speech.  See Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) 
(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”).  
But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (establishing that First 
Amendment protection does not turn on the “‘truth, popularity, or social utility’” of 
expressed ideas and beliefs and that the “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, 
and . . .  must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ 
that they ‘need . . . to survive.’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 445 (1963))). 
30 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (holding that although 
false speech is “particularly valueless,” it is protected under the First Amendment except 
when spoken about a public figure with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for 
the truth); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974) (concluding that states 
have “substantial latitude” in fashioning legal remedies for private individuals whose 
reputations are injured by defamatory falsehoods); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 
(determining that defamatory falsehoods about a public official’s official conduct are 
protected unless “the statement was made with ‘actual malice’”). 
31 376 U.S. at 271, 279–80.  The court emphasized that false speech is also protected but 
then proceeded to carve out a rule that hinged on the truth or falsity of the statement at 
issue.  Id. at 271, 279–80.  By doing this, the Court arguably opened the door to future 
debate within the case law. 
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to reputation.32  Additionally, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Court 
declared that false statements were valueless and interfered with the 
“truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”33  The Court then 
held that public officials may “recover for the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress” only upon a showing that the defamatory 
publication contained a false statement of fact made with reckless 
disregard for whether it was true or not or with knowledge of its 
falsity.34 
After these rulings, and to settle some debate, the Court next 
distinguished perjury statutes from those attempting to restrict pure 
false statements of fact.35  In United States v. Dunnigan, the Court 
proclaimed that the constitutionality of perjury statutes must be left 
unquestioned, as they are necessary “[t]o uphold the integrity of our trial 
system.”36  Concluding that perjury statutes are distinctly different from 
pure false speech, the Court emphasized that testimony under oath puts 
the witness on notice of the penalties if his or her statements are false.37  
Thus, the Court held that the government could prohibit perjury as long 
as it concerned a material matter and was made with willful intent to 
deliver false testimony.38 
Further, courts have also upheld statutes criminalizing the making of 
false statements to government officials in communications involving 
official matters.39  In Minnesota v. Crawley, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
applied the overbreadth doctrine but upheld a statute that criminalized 
making a false report that an officer had committed an act of police 
misconduct.40  Using the overbreadth doctrine to analyze the issue, and 
providing a narrow interpretation of the statutory language, marked a 
new direction for courts to take when determining whether a false 
                                                 
32 418 U.S. at 348–49; see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (acknowledging 
that, in defamation cases, there is no constitutional protection for false statements made 
knowingly or those made with reckless disregard for the truth). 
33 485 U.S. at 52. 
34 Id. at 56. 
35 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(recognizing that “[p]erjured testimony ‘is at war with justice’ because it can cause” a 
judgment to be rendered that does not rest on truth (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 
(1945))). 
36 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173–74 (1986); United 
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1980); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 
(1978)). 
37 Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97. 
38 Id. at 94, 97. 
39 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) as 
a permissible regulation on false speech). 
40 819 N.W.2d 94, 97–98, 105 (Minn. 2012). 
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statement of fact could be narrowly construed as falling under one of the 
already unprotected categories of speech.41 
Accordingly, all of the above cases denote the tension within the 
courts regarding how to draw the line between regulating pure false 
speech and false statements of fact containing an added element.42  In 
more recent decisions, the courts have revisited this First Amendment 
question repeatedly, which in turn, has led to further discord over how 
to regulate false speech.43  Thus, in an attempt to clarify First 
Amendment jurisprudence on the false speech issue, in 2012, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alvarez to determine the 
constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a crime for a 
person to falsely represent themselves as being the recipient of any 
military awards or medals.44 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 
A. The Alvarez Opinion 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alvarez, there was still 
much discord in the case law regarding the level of protection false 
statements should receive and whether they fell under one of the 
traditionally unprotected categories.45  In the plurality opinion, written 
by Justice Kennedy, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act as an 
unconstitutional content-based restriction on free speech.46  The Court 
                                                 
41 Cf. id.  (holding that when possible, the court will narrowly construe a law subject to 
overbreadth, “so as to limit its scope to conduct that falls outside first amendment 
protection” (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W. 2d 507, 509 (Minn. 1991))). 
42 See supra notes 30–41 (discussing the constitutional protection afforded to false 
statements in various contexts). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 699 F.3d 356, 368–69 (4th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing 
pure speech from expressive conduct and upholding an insignia statute that made it a 
crime to wear a military uniform or to wear military or imitation medals without 
authorization and with the intent to deceive); United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 1056, 
1062–64 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying an overbreadth analysis to uphold a statute that prohibits 
the knowing, willful, and malicious conveyance of false information in an attempt to do 
any act that would be a crime); United States v. Amster, 484 Fed. App’x. 338, 344 (11th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 628 (2012) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act as facially 
unconstitutional post-Alvarez). 
44 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542–43 (plurality opinion); see 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (outlining 
the language of the Stolen Valor Act at issue in Alvarez); supra note 7 (providing the text of 
the Stolen Valor Act). 
45 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing case examples that illustrate the 
Court’s view of false speech). 
46 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act as 
unconstitutional and reasoning that even false speech should receive protection).  Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined the plurality opinion; Justice 
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first declared that false statements of fact alone are not enough to render 
them outside the protection of the First Amendment and declined to 
create a novel category that would render them presumptively 
unprotected.47  Second, the Court concluded that the statute had a 
sweeping effect rendering it overbroad and facially invalid.48  Finally, the 
Court held that the Act did not satisfy strict scrutiny, as it was not the 
least speech-restrictive means available.49  This Part examines each of 
these three central holdings in turn. 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy, joined by three other 
members of the court, first discussed the history of the Court’s treatment 
of false speech.50  Disagreeing with the dissenters that false statements of 
fact are generally unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court found 
it necessary to distinguish between previously upheld statutes regulating 
false speech and the Stolen Valor Act.51  The plurality thus found that the 
central distinction was that the Stolen Valor Act simply regulated false 
speech alone, while all of the other statutes regulated false speech that 
fell in one of three categories:  (1) false statement to a government 
official; (2) perjury; or (3) “false representation that one is speaking as a 
[g]overnment official or on behalf of the [g]overnment.”52  The Court 
                                                                                                             
Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined; and 
Justice Alito filed a lengthy dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.  
Id. at 2541. 
47 See id. at 2544 (stating that there are only a few categorical exceptions under the First 
Amendment but that false speech alone is not encompassed within one of the exceptions); 
supra text accompanying note 27 (outlining the various exceptions to the prohibition of 
content-based regulations on speech). 
48 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547–48 (expressing concern over the Stolen Valor Act’s lack 
of a limiting principle). 
49 Id. at 2551. 
50 Id. at 2544–47. 
51 Compare id. (explaining that certain federal false statement statutes are valid and 
inapplicable in the context of the Alvarez case), with id. at 2562 (Alito, J., dissenting) (using 
valid false statement restrictions to further support the view that false statements are not 
protected under the First Amendment). 
52 Id. at 2545–46 (plurality opinion).  The dissent asserted that the speech prohibited 
under the Stolen Valor Act did cause significant harm.  Id. at 2558–59 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
In his opinion, Justice Alito pointed out that the individuals who falsely represent 
themselves as award recipients usually do so for some material gain, such as government 
benefits.  See, e.g., id. (stating that in one region of the United States, “12 men had 
defrauded the Department of Veterans Affairs out of more than $1.4 million in veteran’s 
benefits”).  Additionally, Justice Alito noted that there is a less tangible harm that involves 
the debasement of the distinctive honor of the award along with the “‘slap in the face’” the 
legitimate recipients feel.  Id. at 2559.  Justice Alito even went so far as to compare the Act 
with trademark statutes, which are enacted for the sole reason of preventing a diluting 
effect of brands.  Id.  He concluded that “preserving the integrity of our country’s top 
military honors is at least as worthy as that of protecting the prestige associated with fancy 
watches and designer handbags.” Id. 
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further emphasized that, while there is no “‘freewheeling authority to 
declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment,’” upon “‘persuasive evidence’” that a category of speech 
has traditionally been prohibited, even if formerly unrecognized, the 
Court may so declare the speech unprotected.53  The Court then held that 
in this instance, the government did not provide such evidence to show 
“that false statements generally should constitute a new category of 
unprotected speech.”54 
After determining that the prohibited speech in the Act was 
constitutionally protected, the Court expressed that the Act would have 
a sweeping effect, in that it would apply to all false statements on this 
subject whether made in public or in whispered conversations within the 
home.55  The Court further noted that because there was no limiting 
instruction within the statute, if it were upheld, the government could 
create an “endless list” of subjects to single out and, thus, chill other 
protected speech.56  As a result, the Court held that the statute was 
overbroad and unconstitutional.57 
Finally, the Court addressed Alvarez’s challenge that the Act was 
unconstitutional as applied to him.58  After an in-depth inquiry, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the government’s interest in protecting the 
                                                 
53 Id. at 2547 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 2560–61 (Alito, J., dissenting) (collecting 
cases that support the assertion that the Court has traditionally prohibited many kinds of 
false statements of fact).  Justice Alito further pointed out that over 100 statutes punish false 
statements made in connection with areas of federal agency concern.  Id. at 2562 (citing to, 
as an example, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, “which makes it a crime to ‘knowingly and willfully’ make 
any ‘materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation’ in ‘any matter 
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of 
the United States”). 
54 Id. at 2547 (plurality opinion).  Disagreeing with the plurality, Justice Alito stated that 
there was a long tradition of Congress protecting the country’s military honor system.  Id. 
at 2557 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 2547 (plurality opinion). 
56 Id.; see Minnesota v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 104–05 (2012) (stating that the 
overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” and should only be used to facially invalidate 
laws when there is not a limiting construction present and the statute’s sweep prohibits a 
substantial amount of protected speech along with unprotected speech). 
57 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548 (plurality opinion).  Dissenting, Justice Alito stated that the 
plurality did not show that the statute was substantially overbroad.  Id. at 2565 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Alito further emphasized his disagreement by proclaiming that the 
statute was in fact limited in five ways:  (1) it applied to a narrow category of false speech 
that could almost always be proved or disproved; (2) “it concerned facts that are squarely 
within the speaker’s personal knowledge”; (3) a conviction would require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the speaker knew the statement was false; (4) it applied only to 
statements that could be inferred as communicating actual facts, not satire or parody; and 
(5) it was viewpoint neutral in that the false statements would not likely be associated 
“with any particular political or ideological message.”  Id. at 2557. 
58 Id. at 2548 (plurality opinion). 
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integrity of the Medal of Honor was sufficiently compelling.59  Despite 
this finding, the Court concluded that there was no causal link between 
the government’s interest and Alvarez’s false claim.60  The Court 
reasoned that there was no evidence to support a finding that the 
public’s general perception of military awards was diluted, and thus, the 
Act was not “actually necessary” to achieve the government’s interest.61  
In further support, Justice Kennedy stressed that there were other means, 
such as counterspeech, that could have overcome the lie.62  For these 
reasons, the Court ultimately concluded that the Stolen Valor Act did not 
pass strict scrutiny.63 
B. Alvarez’s Meaning for First Amendment Jurisprudence 
At the outset of the Court’s analysis, Justice Kennedy refused to 
carve out a new category of unprotected speech based on the assertions 
that the false speech at issue in the Stolen Valor Act did not have an 
element of cognizable harm and that there was little evidence to support 
a long tradition of prohibiting such speech.64  Justice Kennedy, however, 
based these assertions on an incomplete analysis.  First, he stated that the 
Act targeted “falsity and nothing more,” but this contention disregards 
much evidence to the contrary.65  The Act’s legislative history indicates 
that Congress had in fact identified that these types of “fraudulent 
claims” not only damage the reputation and esteem of military medals 
but also debase the meaning and honor surrounding such decorations.66  
                                                 
59 Id. at 2549.  In its inquiry, the Court indicated that the Medal of Honor was so 
esteemed that since 1861 it had been awarded only 3476 times.  Id. at 2548.  The court also 
pointedly noted that “[t]he [g]overnment’s interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal 
of Honor is beyond question.”  Id. at 2549.  Providing the backdrop to the legislature’s 
decision to enact the statute, the dissent pointed out that “in a single year, more than 600 
Virginia residents falsely claimed to have won the Medal of Honor.”  Id. at 2558 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
60 Id. at 2549 (plurality opinion). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2550.  The court also noted that a comprehensive list or database of actual medal 
recipients could be used as a means of protecting the Medal of Honor’s integrity.  Id. at 
2551.  On the other hand, the dissent asserted that the Department of Defense indicated any 
database of medal recipients could only go back to recipients since 2001.  Id. at 2559 (Alito, 
J., dissenting).  Further, Justice Alito contradicted Justice Kennedy’s counter speech 
argument by noting that publicly speaking out against imposters would likely increase the 
public’s skepticism rather than remedy the lie.  Id. at 2560. 
63 Id. at 2551 (plurality opinion). 
64 Id. at 2544–45; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s ability 
to declare some categories of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment). 
65 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion). 
66 United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 685 (2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–437, § 2(1), 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006)), aff’d, 132 S. 
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Further, elements of both fraud and material gain are present in the 
prohibited speech.  As the dissent indicates, many individuals who 
falsely hold themselves out as receiving the award do so with the 
intention of obtaining financial rewards, such as government benefits.67  
For those reasons, the plurality incorrectly concluded that there was not 
a cognizable harm present in the false speech the Act aimed to prohibit.   
Moreover, in the second part of his analysis, Justice Kennedy 
rejected the government’s evidence that supported there was a history 
and tradition in First Amendment jurisprudence of not protecting false 
statements of fact.68  Justice Kennedy concluded this despite providing a 
long collection of cases that supported the notion that false speech was 
generally unprotected.69  Even further, like defamation and fraud, which 
Justice Kennedy highlighted, the speech in the Act concerns speech that 
is knowingly false as the claimant knows that he has not received the 
medal.70  Therefore, under Justice Kennedy’s assertion that knowledge or 
reckless disregard for truth or falsity traditionally brings false speech 
outside the reach of the First Amendment, the Court should have also 
found a fraudulent representation about receipt of military decorations 
or medals—made with knowledge or reckless disregard for its falsity—
outside constitutional protection.71 
                                                                                                             
Ct. 2537; see supra note 52 and accompanying text (recognizing that, although less tangible, 
debasement of the distinctive honor of the award and the “slap in the face” actual 
recipients feel are cognizable harms). 
67 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas Zambito, War Crime:  
FBI Targets Fake Heroes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2007, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime.war-crime-fbi-targets-fake-heroes-article-
1.249168); see id. at 2559 (reporting on the defrauding of $1.4 million in veteran’s benefits by 
individuals who falsely claimed to receive military awards (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Northwest Crackdown on Fake Veterans in “Operation Stolen Valor,” U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST.: 
U.S. ATTY’S OFF. WESTERN DISTRICT WASH. (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2007/sep/operationstolenvalor.html)); supra 
note 52 and accompanying text (providing the dissent’s further elaboration on the 
cognizable harms caused by the speech prohibited under the Stolen Valor Act). 
68 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion) (“Our prior decisions have not 
confronted a measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.”). 
69 Supra note 29 and accompanying text; see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion) 
(“‘False statements of fact are particularly valueless [] [because] they interfere with the 
truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas. . . .’” (quoting Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988))).  Further, additional precedent has established that “‘[s]preading 
false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials.’” Id. (quoting 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979)). 
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 704(a)–(b) (2012) (setting forth speech prohibited under the Stolen 
Valor Act). 
71 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545–46 (plurality opinion) (pointing to several examples 
provided by the government of permissible regulations on false speech); see also Illinois ex 
rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003) (holding that the 
Constitution precludes attaching adverse consequences to fundraising speech except those 
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Next, although the Court did not explicitly frame its analysis under 
the overbreadth doctrine, it relied on those principles when Justice 
Kennedy struck down the statute as overbroad.72  However, in applying 
those principles, the plurality failed to determine whether the Act’s reach 
was “substantial[ly]” overbroad.73  Instead, Justice Kennedy placed his 
emphasis on the fact that the Act would reach both public and private 
settings.74  However, he improperly emphasized this fact because other 
statutes that protect the country’s military honors also reach into public 
and private settings but have not been struck down as overbroad.75  
Therefore, it is an obvious contradiction to say that one statute’s reach is 
legitimate while another’s, though virtually identical, is not. 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy asserted that the Act was overbroad 
because it did not have a limiting instruction.76  He reached this 
conclusion even though First Amendment jurisprudence generally 
requires that the court applying the overbreadth analysis construe the 
statute narrowly to avoid constitutional issues if the statute is subject to 
such limiting construction.77  Indeed, the Stolen Valor Act is subject to 
                                                                                                             
statements made about a material fact, with knowledge of its falsehood, intent to mislead 
the listener, and success in doing so); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (stressing 
that “the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard 
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection”); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279–80 (1964) (asserting that the false statement must be a knowingly false statement or a 
statement made with reckless disregard for its falsity). 
72 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (showing the extent to which the Stolen 
Valor Act could apply). 
73 See Minnesota v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 104–05 (Minn. 2012) (providing a brief 
summary of the overbreadth doctrine); supra note 56 (outlining the overbreadth doctrine as 
discussed in Minnesota v. Crawley); see also supra note 57 (providing the dissent’s evaluation 
of the statute under the overbreadth doctrine). 
74 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547 (plurality opinion) (noting that while the Stolen Valor 
Act in this case applied to a public lie, the prohibition would extend to include a lie made 
in the privacy of one’s home). 
75 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012) (making it a criminal offense to “falsely assume[] or 
pretend[] to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or 
any department, agency or officer”); id. § 1038 (making it a criminal offense to “make[] a 
false statement, with intent to convey false or misleading information, about the death, 
injury, capture, or disappearance of a member of the Armed Forces”); see also United States 
v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943) (upholding a statute that criminalized impersonating 
a government official because it was enacted “‘to maintain the general good repute and 
dignity of the [government] service itself’” (quoting United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74 
(1915))). 
76 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing the Stolen Valor Act 
from other statutes because it did not have a limiting principle). 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 486 (2010) (“‘When a federal court is 
dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the 
statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting 
construction.’” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982))); see also id. 
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such instruction.  According to the dissent, there are at least five inherent 
limiting instructions in the Act.78  For example, the category of false 
speech the Stolen Valor Act aims to encompass only applies to 
misrepresentations about military awards and could almost always be 
proved or disproved.79  Under this example alone, the plurality could 
have narrowly construed the statute and upheld its constitutionality.  
However, by not considering all reasonable constructions of the Act in 
an attempt to save the statute, Justice Kennedy incorrectly applied the 
overbreadth analysis and, thus, reached an inaccurate result. 
Lastly, in the final part of the Court’s analysis, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that the Stolen Valor Act did not pass strict scrutiny because 
there was no causal link between the harm and the speech, and it was 
not the least restrictive means to accomplish the government’s 
compelling interest.80  These findings, however, are unfounded.  First, 
they ignored the Stolen Valor Act’s legislative history, which indicated 
that these types of fraudulent claims do in fact cause “damage [to] the 
reputation and meaning of such decorations and medals.”81  Further, 
empirical data revealed that false medal recipient claims contributed to 
the swindling of over $1.4 million in veteran’s benefits.82   
Further, the plurality incorrectly compared the evidence in Alvarez to 
the findings in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.83  In Brown, 
the state’s research findings consisted of a few psychologists who found 
an unreliable correlation between violent video games and minors’ 
                                                                                                             
(“‘[T]o the extent the statutory text alone is unclear, our duty to avoid constitutional 
objections makes it especially appropriate to look beyond the text in order to ascertain the 
intent of its drafters.’” (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) (Stevens, 
J., concurring))); Minnesota v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 105 (Minn. 2012) (discussing the 
role of limiting instructions when applying the overbreadth doctrine). 
78 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (providing the dissent’s list of limiting 
constructions). 
79 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The speech punished by the Act 
is . . . varifiably false.”). 
80 Id. at 2549 (plurality opinion); see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 
(2011) (highlighting the need to demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the targeted 
speech and the actual harm a statute aims to prevent, in order to pass strict scrutiny). 
81 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-437, § 2(1), 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 704 
(2012))). 
82 See id. at 2558–59 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Northwest Crackdown on Fake Veterans in 
“Operation Stolen Valor,” U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2007/sep/operationstolenvalor.html). 
83 Compare Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–39 (2011) (holding that research findings by 
psychologists did not demonstrate a causal link between violent video games and harmful 
effects on children), with Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (plurality opinion) (citing Brown for the 
proposition that “[t]here must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and 
the injury to be prevented”). 
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aggression.84  Conversely, in Alvarez, the Department of Justice 
established a causal link that false claimants used these lies to receive 
government benefits.85  Based on these facts alone, Justice Kennedy’s 
conclusion was unjustified as there was a demonstrable causal link 
between the harm and the speech at issue. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy concluded his analysis by insisting that 
counter speech would be a better, less speech-restrictive method of 
remedying the lies referred to in the Act.86  This emphasis, however, is 
misplaced as it neglects the idea that counter speech would likely have a 
converse effect and increase the public’s skepticism by, in effect, publicly 
calling into question anyone who has ever claimed to have received the 
medal.87  Therefore, the Act was undoubtedly the least restrictive means 
to protect the government’s interest in preserving the reputation of 
military honorees and the Court should have upheld the validity of the 
Stolen Valor Act. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s ruling in Alvarez threatens the integrity of previous court 
holdings, which have held that there was little to no protection under the 
First Amendment for false statements of fact.  By refusing to officially 
carve out a new category of unprotected speech for false statements or to 
narrowly construe the Act’s speech to fit within one of the preceding 
unprotected categories, the Court starkly departed from a long line of 
cases that traditionally prohibited such speech.  This broad ruling 
circumvents the principles behind other unprotected false speech, such 
as defamation and false statements to government officials, which also 
aim to protect integrity, reputation, and esteem. 
Further, by construing the Stolen Valor Act as broadly applying to 
false statements of fact alone, the plurality ignores the clear limiting 
instructions inherent within the Act’s language.  Moreover, to hold that 
the Act did not pass strict scrutiny completely disregards the fact that 
there was an actual causal link between the diminished reputation of the 
military awards and the false speech at issue, and fails to acknowledge 
that counter speech would cause more harm than benefit to the 
                                                 
84 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739. 
85 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (reporting an example of $1.4 million in 
government benefits that individuals fraudulently stole by claiming to be a medal 
recipient). 
86 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550 (plurality opinion). 
87 See id. at 2560 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining how counterspeech would actually 
exacerbate the harm caused); see also supra note 62 (discussing the dissent’s evaluation of 
the alternative methods stressed by the plurality). 
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Congressional Medal of Honor’s integrity.  Ultimately, the effect of the 
Court’s ruling is not only that imposters will continue to defame the 
Congressional Medal of Honor but also that future efforts to seek 
protection from false statements of fact will likely be met with a closed 
door. 
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